Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts research and development in areas that include cross-training of unit personnel in critical activities, an area with applicability for military planning and training. Of special interest is cross-training for combat surge conditions (CTS).
There is a variety of important and necessary considerations related to organizational, training, and social factors which must be identified and defined in order to properly plan and/or evaluate CTS designs.
This report describes a set of guidelines and rationale for such planning and evaluation. It presents the development of a minimum set of considerations which must be addressed, as well as some degree of guidance toward implementation.
Further development of the ideas in this report will lead to development of more complete user-oriented procedures for CTS design decisions faced by military planners and trainers. In response to inquiries fro, the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA), the Army Research Institute in 1984 initiated a unit and force design project to look into the area of cross-training for personnel in preparation for ccobat surge activities. Specifically, a process was sought for evaluating various methods of cross-training for surge (CTS) presented to CACDA by proponent schools. The purpose of CTS is to improve unit and battalion sustainability in a combat surge situation.
It has also been recognized that military leaders, such as battalion cmetanders, are often inundated with the tasks necessary for battalion and unit operations. In that light, certain key eleents in this report have been highlighted (capitalized) to facilitate scanning for particular areas of interest or need. This paper outlines in stepwise fashion a procedure for signaling potential problcms and major decision points during the design stage of any particular CTS approach.
Procedure:
The basic approach entails identifying the critical factors involved in the temtporary re-allocation of non-critical personnel (e.g., drivers) to mission-critical tasks (e.g., gunners) during periods of unexpectedly high enemy activity (surge periods).
A selected body of relevant military and non-military literature was examined fra" a huuman-factors, manpower, personnel and training (HMPT) "erspective. Further, unit activities were examined in detail in terms of what must be completed and who is available in combat conditions. Guidelines incorporating minimwt, necessary considerations for CTS were developed and described, following an organizational design and HMPT approach. The interested reader may refer to any or all sections. As much as possible, sections are kept independent, to facilitate modification/updating of each separately. A BRIEF CHECKLIST OF NECESSARY CONSIDERATIONS IS INCLUDED ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Identification of nission-critical tasks; identification of personnel temiporarily available during surge period (e.,j., drivers); matching of critical tasks with available personnel; training personnel in surge-relevant skills (e.g., as gunners); skills maintenance requirentents. Also important: to consider training gunners (or others) for post-surge "clean-up' activities such as equipment repair/naintenance, casuality identification. Presented in a step-by-step format.
TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS:
Discussion centers around advantages of various approaches for enhancing secondary (infrequently called-upon) task perforance.
Approaches mentioned include job aids such as labeling, colorcoding of equipment, anC mnienonic techniques; optimal methods of training; and optinal anounts of training to provide, given military contingencies.
SOCIAL FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS:
Identified areas of concern include possible motivational effects of experiencing changes in career progression; effects on group cohesion of massive personnel substitutions in surge conditions, potentially deleterious effects on unit morale of having to replace critical, top personnel in critical tasks by those only secondarily trained in critical tasks.
Suggested approaches are briefly discussed.
As in other areas where military doctrine is concerned, many of the questions encountered are specific to the military setting. As such, there is not always a direct transfer of research findings front other areas. For certain questions, there is an identified requiretment for military-specific research efforts.
Utilization of Findings:
a. As guidelines for use in objectively planning and evaluating CTS approaches.
It is anticipated that these findings can be utilized to help maximize ccnibat effectiveness in pre-surge situations and help nake more efficient the return to readiness in post-surge conditions. b. As conceptual basis for guiding applied research efforts in the areas of training for surge/stress conditions. 
BACKGROUND
In response to inquiries fr,, the Combined Arms Ccmbat Development Activity (CACDA), the Army Research Institute (ARI) in 1984 began looking into the area of unit and force design; CACDA itself was responding to particular suggestions front proponent schools.
With changes in military technologies (equipment, training) and doctrine (e.g., light division) as well as in the nature of enemy threat (e.g., potential battle areas in Central America), the schools were ccmpelled to modify their own doctrine and practices.
Such a state of flux can provide the opportunity to examine practices and beliefs which had evolved over time, but which had not recently been addressed in a systenatic manner. The notion of C-T in the military currently exists in several forms. These will be briefly reviewed below. The discussion will then center around one particular app-ach to C-T.
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Current Forms of Cross-Training CAREER CHANGES: One form of cross-training occurs when an MOS is phased out or a career-path modified, perhaps as the result of changes in equipment or doctrine. "Cross-training," more appropriately referred to as re-training in this case, is used to provide the soldier with a new set of primary skills. (See Skinner, 1983 , AD-A135927). As described here, this form of C-T does not apply to the situation under examination.
COMMON SOLDIERING TASKS. On one level, it seems a logical matter to train soldiers not only in their primary duties, such as radar repair, but also on a set of secondary tasks (e.g., gunners), to be utilized during time of emergency or temporary need. Indeed, the traditional sequence of training involves a broad-based set of connion soldiering tasks, introduced during basic training. These tasks are described, e.g., in Soldier's Manuals and in FM 21-3, and include first aid, handling the M-16 rifle ("every soldier is an infantryman"), operating conmunications and navigation equipment, etc. No matter what their MOS, soldiers must be cross-trained so as to possess the skills required for coaiton soldiering tasks. Although scmetinmes referred to as C-T, this is more accurately seen as part of soldier training--i.e., training as a soldier first, as a specialist second. SECTION TRAINING. Most closely addressing the need referred to in the introductory paragraph is cross-training which would be carried out as part of "1section training" (e.g., as described in FM 6-50). There are three objectives of section training:
1. To train individuals in their primary tasks.
2. To train the section as a team,.
3.
To cross-train individuals in the various tasks, duties, and responsibilities within the section.
How should cross-training be viewed within the battery/section? According to FM 6-50, cross-training is extrmiely important to overall mission readiness as well as to the professional developmnent and advancentent of the soldiers in the section where it is conducted. Without cross-training, sections are kept front operating effectively, since individuals are not prepared to function adequately on more than one job. Further, soldiers who do not beccme proficient in their present and next-higher skill level cannot qualify for prcniotion.
These last two approaches termed cross-training above are peripherally related to the surge conditions under consideration. Yet, they lack scae specific features which would more closely meet the present need. It is to such features that the discussion will now turn.
The remainder of this paper will deal with several aspects of C-T as it might apply to preparing for conditions of surge. As described earlier, C-T for ccatoin soldiering tasks is alr "ady institutionalized (as described in Soldier's Manuals).
Furthermore, ;-me guidelines do exist concerning when and how C-T might be conducted within Eections (as described in FM 6-50).
Thus, the notion of military cross-training for certain requiremtents is, in general terms, not new.
It is appropriate for only selected personnel, e.g., those who would be available for duty (free of other inotediate duties), near conhat action, and trainable for a specialized task.
b.
It is geared specifically toward meeting needs arising during surge conditions.
To differentiate the tern, from, previous uses, the modified fornt "CrossTraining for Surge" (CTS) will be emiployed here in referring to this new variation of C-T. This paper will proceed by addressing the following points related to CTS: 
Standardization
A key question which arises in deciding who and how to train is, How to identify critical personnel? Ancillary to that question are issues concerning which sub-set of tasks should be chosen for optinimm CTS.
These matters, identifying key personnel and key tasks, have heretofore been left to the judgment of individual unit caonianders. However, the questions and suggestions received by CACDA point up an apparent need for standardization of such procedures. The need for such standardized guidance h 3 7W ZTr.
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has recently been discussed elsewhere (Fitton, 1985) , in relation to the development of military doctrine in general; nowhere would standardization be more appropriate than in the early stages of training efforts. CACDA's current need is for guidelines for use in evaluating suggestions for CTS frcn, the various schools. This paper will discuss a procedure to identify or classify the important factors which must be taken into account in evaluating CTS proposals.
THE INTENTION IS TO OUTLINE A USABLE PROCEDURE WHICH, FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO SEQUENCE, CAN SIGNAL POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, DRAWBACKS AND MAJOR DECISION POINTS DURING THE PLANNING OR EVALUATION PROCESS.
This should permit certain types of errors to be avoided before ccmaitnment is made to their execution, and should provide for a more sound and efficient planning process. It should be recognized that this procedure is neither exhaustive in scope nor carved in stone. That is, it is antenable to change as needed to neet situational requirements and other developments. ITS MORE APPROPRIATE USE WILL BE AS A
STEP-THROUGH CHECKLIST IN EVALUATING THE THOROUGHNESS OF SUGGESTED FORMS OF -" CTS, OR AS A GUIDE IN DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS.
Before beginning the main discussion, a few more basic points must be introduced. These have to do with the essential feasibility or practicability of CTS. Woile all three aspects deserve discussion, the main focus here will be on organizational constraints. The reason for this is simple practicality. If, in evaluating various proposed approaches, potential constraints and sanctions are found to be too costly or even insurmountable in certain cases, the proposal would be dropped. In that case, there would be no need for concern with training or social factors. This is not to say that such factors are unimportant, but rather that their need is predicated on the status of other system constraints.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONCERNS
The notion of feasibility for CTS carries at least one important assumption that warrants brief mention. CTS CONSTITUTES THE CAPACITY TO RE-ALLOCATE KEY PERSONNEL DURING SURGE. THE IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION IS THAT A BATTALION'S MODIFIED TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (MTO&E) DEISGN IS SUCH THAT "SLACK RESOURCES" ARE TEMPORARILY AVAILABLE DURING SURGE CONDITIONS. Such an assumption is correct based on the prenise that the MTO&E reflects personnel and equipmient necessary to meet sustaimnent (The level of force
needed to meet the expected enenty threat levels), and not surge (characterized as unexpected, if temtporary, threat levels), conditions. To the extent that such is the case, and evidence suggests that it is, the MTO&E may include cooks, drivers, military police (MPs), mechanics, etc., whose designated tasks may be cyclical or otherwise postponable during surge. That is, for scome temporary period of tine, such personnel make up a "new' pool of resources which was not available during normal sustaimtent of operations. Logically, such would be the case in any optimally designed organization.
This resource pool would most likely be available if an approach similar to the Force Packaging Methodology (FPM) were applied. According to FPM, those forces most critical during the early stages of conflict (when surge may well occur) are systemtatically identified. These forces receive highest priority and consequently are resourced at a higher level than are other forces. The result is a higher likelihood of reserve ccrnbat capability.
A SECOND POINT HAS TO DO WITH WHAT TAKES PLACE DURING SURGE CONDITIONS, TYPICALLY RESULTING FROM AN UNFORESEEN OR UNEXPECTEDLY INTENSE ENE!4Y ATTACK.
When would substitute individuals be needed? Only when (a) primary keyposition holders (e.g., gunners) have been taken out of action, i.e., must be replaced due to exhaustion or casualty, or (b) more depth is needed. How long carVnmust substitutes be away frcn, their own primary duties? This may depend on the nature of the threat, on the amount of anaunition available, physical fatigue, maintenance-free period of operation of the equipiment, or, a likely limiting factor, a general need to return to and perform the primary duty at sonme point. Potential limiting factors for a given set of scenarios must be addressed in any feasibility study.
ANOTHER POINT OF CONCERN ARISES WHEN CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO WHAT OCCURS
SUBSEQUENT TO SUFIE. Do things innmediately revert to "sustaiment mode" conditions? In actuality, likely they do not. Primary key position holders will either never return, or will return only after sonme period of recuperation. The substitute personnel must, if they are capable, return to and re-normalize their postponed duties. Both situations suggest a very poor, transition, state of combat readiness inatediately following a surge. The transition state, or window of vulnerability, may not be normalized, typically, until reinforcemnents are available.
SINCE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT READINESS BE QUICKLY REGAINED, C-T MAY BE REQUIRED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION AS WELL.
That is, gunners may, post-surge, be needed for body-tagging, anmunition re-supply, or equiptment repair and maintenance. Re-normalization in this sense is so critical that it perhaps should be addressed as a separate topic, but it needs to be mentioned here as well.
This leads to the conclusion that an en~my threat must not only be met, but that beyond this the threat must be neutralized for same period of time ("beaten back") to allow for return to designed ccnibat readiness. Tn one sense, the substitutes must perform, at least as well as, if not better than, the primary troops if such neutralization is to be realized. (One elemtent favoring the substitutes' performance in cciparison to that of the regulars is that any degree of surprise held by the enemy would soon be spent.) Another important step is to identify which forms of available weaponry and other equipment (e.g., ccmatunications) are most critical during surge; these are natural candidates for CTS consideration. 
CTS Analysis
As state above, THE MAIN FOCUS HERE IS ON DETERMINING THE FEASIBILITY OF CROSS-TRAINING FOR SURGE.
This topic was discussed in a concept paper by Dawdy and Hawley (1984) , the substance of which is included below. The procedure, which can be termed a CTS feasibility analysis, is a logical, step-wise approach consisting of four essential stages.
a. Identifying a pool of scenario dependent target tasks which must be performed in order to maintain unit functioning. These "target" sets of tasks are the focus for CTS.
b. Identifying those individuals who (I) can be temporarily freed from other immediate duties; (2) are foreseeably near enough the ccnabat scene to potentially substitute for a casualty or otherwise augment personnel in the critical position, and (3) have the aptitude to be properly trained and to maintain the necessary skills. This group makes up the source pool of personnel to be trained.
c. Conducting a cost-benefit trade-off analysis on the target-source combinations to identify those which should be considered in more depth.
d. Determining the remtaining feasibility (organizational, logistical, administrative) of potential target-source ccnxbinations. A CTS feasibility analysis, then, is concerned with the relationship between cross-training and unit effectiveness. The analysis, in this case, is directed at the problen, of identifying options for temporarily increasin the unit or section's designed effectiveness under heavy load or in the face of condbat losses while using only existing, intra-unit (or section) personnel and equipment resources.
Once the critical elements have been identified (steps 1 & 2), the feasibility to be determined is two-fold: (a) A target-source cost-benefit analysis represents an assessment of the military utility of using the previously identified task-personnel catmbinations; (b) the target-source feasibility assessment concerns the a priori feasibility or possibility of attempting to train and etploy menbers of the source pool to perform target tasks. It is important that this order be maintained, if efficiency in the procedures is to be achieved. In particular, performing such a cost-benefit analysis could conceivably negate having to pursue a number of potential but low-utility caribinations.
While certain selected combinations might be feasible (i.e., personnel are deemed available, nearby, trainable), the logistics of training could well present unrealistic and unachievable requirements. In the second sense, selected target-source matches may be found to provide only tenuous or insignificant increments in unit capability. Thus, feasibility turns into an issue of joint criticality--in simple terms, the ccmabinations must be jointly achievable in nature and meaningful in result.
STEPS IN CONDUCTING THE ANALYSIS: FUNCTIONAL OPERANTS
As stated earlier, the purpose of these guidelines is in part to aid in the evaluation of various suggested alternative forms of CTS. Since there can be a variety of constructions which might be considered, a caton focus could provide order to the evaluation task; one such focal point will be presented below.
IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE FOUR ISSUES NOTED ABOVE, IT IS FIRST NECESSARY TO CHARACTERIZE UNIT ACTIVITIES REQUIRED UNDER STATED MISSION CONTINGENCIES. A standardizing mechanism to help serve this purpose involves describing unit requiremtents in terns of what are referred to as functional operants (FOs).
As the tern, is used here, a FO is defined as a unit function which must be performed Lo designed standards; any decremient would critically lessen the probability of mission success. Exaples of potential FOs are:
CONTACT OPERANTS: Operants engaged in activities that deal with direct or indirect contact with the eney. Exaples: infantry operations, artillery fire, air assault, and armor operations.
CONTROL OPERANTS: Operants engaged in activities concerned with directing the performance of other operants.
Exa,ples: cmrand posts, operations centers, military policing.
INFORMATION OPERANTS: Operants concerned with gathering and assimilating the input required to control other operants. Examkples: intelligence/survey tea, activities, meteorological activities.
MOBILITY OPERANTS: Operants concerned with the transportation of personnel, equipment, or supplies.
MEDIA OPERANTS: Operants concerned with transferring information anong other operants. Examples: message transmission/reception (TR); data TR.
SUPPORT OPERANTS: Operants required to sustain other operants. Examples: supply, maintenance, food service, and medical service activities.
Once unit FOs are identified, they must be organized hierarchically into what is termed a "network dependency structure," for subsequent use in the CTS analysis. (Figure 1 presents an example of a hypothetical operant dependency structure for artillery fire.) Much of the information required to develop these hierarchies can be obtained frc, unit mission and collective front-end analyses; such analyses would utilize Camander's, Soldier's, Field, and Training Manuals. The CTS analysis outlined below is based on the notion of FOs. 3. ESTABLISHING THE POOLS. One approach to establishing the needed Target and Source pools is derived froi the hierarchy presented in Figure 1. a. Review the structure, using the critical load time as a criterion, and remove operants which by judgment could be delayed beyond the time established for analysis; list these as Source items.
b. Start with the operant at the top of the structure and record the number of subsequent dependent operants (ND). Continue down through the structure until each operant has an ND recorded for it. c. Using the unit operant structure, identify operants which are in a non-redundant path, listing them, as Target items.
d. Review the operants in the structure that have not been identified as either source or target itetis. Select operants that are reasonably redundant and add them to the source list; add the remaining operants to the target list.
Utility Assessment
The next two steps may be transposed at times, depending on the organization under assessment.
THE CRITICAL RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ELIMINATE AS MANY UNACCEPTABLE (INFEASIBLE, LOW UTILITY) ALTERNATIVES AS POSSIBLE AT THE EARLIEST POINT IN THE PROCESS POSSIBLE. SUCH A PARSIMONIOUS APPROACH IS NECESSARY IF EFFICIENCY IS TO BE ACHIEVED AND MAINTAINED IN CARRYING OUT THE

PROCESS.
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COST-BENEFIT TRADE-OFF.
If at this point a candidate source operant has not been rejected, its m~ntbers provide a feasible pool of personnel for CTS in the target operant tasks. Before naking a final decision, however, an assessment of the overall military utility of implententing CTS choices must be made. The notion underlying CTS is the temporary sacrifice of one functional operant to sustain another activity judged more critical. It is necessary to insure that the source operant can indeed be sacrificed temporarily, and that the cost of preparing for the anticipated substitution will be offset by an expected gain in comibat capability.
Optimization of the utility process at this point requires, at minimuni, ranking of Target and Source lists for use as a guide; the objective will be to trade minimum, sacrifice for maximum gain. This can be described in two steps, to be carried out by subject matter experts (SMEs): a. Weighting the Operants and Rank Ordering the Target and Source Lists.
Establish survival probabilities (SP), during the tine frame to be addressed by the analysis, for the unit functional operants by either adopting figures used for "war gante" models or by obtaining estimates fram SMEs.
For each operant, divide its ND by its SP to obtain an operant weight (OW). The C reflects the criticality of each operant to mission success or to survival. A high Target OW represents a high need for redundancy, while a high Source OW indicates existing high redundancy.
Rank order the Target list so that the operant with the largest recorded OW is at the top. If the Source list is exhausted, the target unit functional operant is considered critical, and no feasible match is found, consideration should be given to modifying the unit's designed posture.
The matching process continues until the Target list is exhausted or until the operants rEnaining on the list are not considered by SMEs to be critical.
4. SOURCE-TARGET FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT. The final step is to determine which of the potential source-target matches are indeed feasible; this is actually performed by the rejection of infeasible target-source candidates.
Potential constraining factors include: (a) source-target ccmbat role congruence; (b) training prerequisites; (c) initial skill acquisition; (d) skill maintenance. Each of these constraints is discussed below; the Manuals mentioned earlier could provide an a priori source for guidance. It can be seen that, in the order presented here, this fourth step is quite costly in terms of resources and time required for adequate ccpletion. This is precisely the purpose for its being included only after the largest nuniber of alternatives have been eliminated.
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Role congruence concerns whether source mimbers' primary jobs will place thEnt in the right place at the right tinie, with manageable role deiands to perform specific secondary responsibilities.
For example, if MPs are to be trained as revenge-ntode Stinger gunners, will their normial cobbat responsibilities place then, in a location where they can be useful as gunners? If not, training the, as gunners would have no utility, i.e., might be feasible, but of no value.
b. Prerequisites. If source personnel pass the first step, they must next be deeiked to possess the aptitutes required for admission to secondary training (CTS) courses (see AR 611-201) or may have to be rejected. The defintion of "aptitude" used here would differ frni, that in AR 611-201, since CTS candidate personnel would likely be trained only for part of the duties required of another military occupational specialty (MOS).
c. The third feasibility consideration is initial skills acquisition within CTS itself. If the identified tasks are to be performed by unit or section nemibers, as stated earlier, CTS can be conducted as part of section training. Several practical approaches are suggested in FM 6-50; an exaieple is presented in the following paragraph.
FOLLOWING TRAINING TO SOME PRE-SPECIFIED CRITERIA, THE SECTION SHOULD BE READY FOR UNIT-LEVEL TRAINING. In the likely occurrence that tine and • resources required for unit training are not available at this point, the time could be used for section-level CTS. Typically, CTS could be conducted by going through section training again, the second timte with individuals either *' in another job at the same level or in their present job but trained at the next higher level. The vacated positions would simulate combat losses. Section evaluations (as outlined in the appropriate Field Manuals) would help identify weak areas in need of continued training.
In the broader case, WHERE CTS CANNOT BE PART OF SECTION TRAINING (E.G., TIME RESOURCES, COMMANDER, ETC., CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE), THE NORMAL TRAINING PIPELINE WOULD HAVE TO BE UTILIZED. HERE, OTHER BASIC, BUT IMPORTANT, ISSUES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIMITATIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED. a. Can existing training sites acconaodate the extra load imposed by CTS dEnkands?
b. Will source personnel be in reasonable proximity to an appropriate training site? If not, what provisions will be made to transport thei to the appropriate site, and maintain the, for the duration of the required training? c. What effect will non-traditional personnel have on the conduct of existing training? Many current courses are based upon assumptions concerning entering trainees' skills and knowledge; altering the trainee pool in any significant way can thus effect the instructional process. A possibility would be that CTS would have its own set of training materials, or comprise a special course.
If issues such as those noted above cannot be realistically and favorably resolved, it is advisable to reject the source personnel. If the probleits are too severe, the CTS option under consideration may have to be redesigned or rejected.
4. After source personnel receive initial training, provisions also must be made for skill maintenance. Relevant issues include: a. Are all source personnel to be stationed in reasonable proximity to a site where appropriate refresher training can take place? What provisions are necessary for personnel who are not? What are the available alternatives? An example might be progranated instructions geared toward refresher training; however, the level of performance required might well denaand actual drills.
b. What are the requirements for proficiency maintenance (e.g., facilities, number, length, scheduling of sessions)? Can existing training facilities accommodate the added load? c. How much time actually will be available to adequately conduct CTS? Is it practical for an extended period of time?
d. Other organizational considerations: Will source primary organizations support the additional training requirements, or will they tend to "token participate?" Evidence obtained by TRASANA in Europe indicates, for example, that initial C-T may not be the major problen.
Rather, maintaining skill proficiency in the field is difficult; one aspect of the problen, is that primary organizations may not support skill maintenance program~s for secondary roles, at times using personnel as drivers or other special duties in place of the intended training (Tubbs, Craig, Hansen, Hughes & Zanmarrita, 1984, # TRASANA 17-84) . This might be subject to change over the long run but it is an operating reality at present.
ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE ABOVE MUST BE ADDRESSED REALISTICALLY. EVEN HIGHLY MOTIVATED PERSONNEL IN ELITE ORGANIZATIONS WILL NOT MAINTAIN SECONDARY ROLE PROFICIENCY IN THE FACE OF NUMEROUS AND RECURRING FACTORS THAT IMPEDE SKILL MANTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS
Clearly, a nuntber of training issues are inseparable frcn, organizational constraints. A num~ber of such interrelated issues were put forth above. However, there is a class of more purely training-specific matters equally worth of mention.
One of these is practical and somiewhat obvious in nature, but deserves recognition:
IT IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR ZM.IPORTANT TO CONDUCT CTS TO A LEVEL QUALIFYING FOR A FULL MOS IN A NEW AREA. For example, equipm'ent-repair training might not be required, because in surge conditions there might well not be time for such repairs. It is another matter whether repair capability might be needed in the post-surge, return-to-readiness period. ONLY THE CRITICAL TASKS PREFERABLY PACKAGES AS SET OF MEANINGFUL TASKS, AS REQUIRED. Which tasks are critical would need to be determined according to procedures such as those already outlined. (Gagne, 1961) .
To facilitate CTS as pertains individuals, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT CRITICAL TASKS NOT BE HELD IN ISOLATION. THESE TASKS SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY JOB AIDS AND/OR BE INCLUDED AS PART OF A LOGICAL SEQUENCE
This would be particularly important in the case where the substitute's primary and secondary activities ntay be close in general procedural similarity, yet requiring their own specific sequence of operations (e.g., the firing of two different types of weapons). This issue is termed "stimulus generalization" by learning theorists: Responses to a particular stimulus (an iten, object or event) will generalize to (be repeated in the presence of) similar stimuli. In the worst case, such generalization could be fatal or disastrous. The area just mentioned is one with little military-specific research. As such, the best guidance is necessarily a mixture of logic (conion sense and experience) and theory. In psychological terms, the relevant theories discussed above may be termed Hierachy of Habits (learning the sequence of individual tasks), Proactive Inhibition or Negative Transfer of Learning (past learning interferes with new learning), and a related theory, Stimulus Generalization (described above).
There is of course the situation where stimulus generalization is beneficial. It may be that two weapons are indeed alike in basic operation, and having ope3rator knowledge of one shortens the learning tinte needed for the other. Such situations can lead to rapid train-up of source personnel, and should be explored whenever possible either with the help of SMEs or through sinple testing and observation.
Alternative Forms of CTS
A recent review of military training-related research (Hagnan & Rose, 1983) can also provid useful guidelines for use in considering CTS alternatives. The major relevant findings are as below.
AMOUNT OF TRAINING. It was generally found that overlearning or repetition of tasks leads to shorter performance times and fewer errors--in other words, is beneficial. In terms of cost-effectiveness, the reviewers' findings suggested that such overtraining take place during the initial training rather than by way of refresher training (with its substantial set-up and coordination costs).
At this point there is little reason to think the case would be different for CTS.
METHOD OF TRAINING.
Example: Testing. In cases where the task does not include a job aid, and particularly in cases where there is a long period of no practice on the task, it was found that testing embedded in the training sequence can facilitate retention of the learning. Noting the organizational problents inherent in scheduling and conducting refresher training for CTSlike activities mentioned earlier (in TRASANA, Europe), this approach takes on added importance.
JOB AIDS.
Example: Mnemonic Technique. The findings reviewed indicated that a job aid such as nnimonic techniques (in the examiple reported, "the first letter of each successive word in a highly image-creating sentence was the first letter of each successive mine-installation step" p. 208) might be more effective than rote repetition of the task only for ccnplex tasks. The suggestion derived fro", this would be to either simplify the CTS tasks where possible, or otherwise to use job aids.
The military currently makes wide use of aids such as color coding, labeling, etc., approaches which could be adapted to enhance CTS and subsequent performance.
An attractive feature of such coding is that no real modification of equipment is required to incorporate the schme. The fact is that properly developed job aids do not detract frcok performance; depending on the costs involved, job aids should perhaps be considered standard items for any for, of CTS.
While there is a good deal of existing knowledge in the areas of -raining and learning, CTS may present a special case which warrants at least prelintinary research of its own.
The ideas which have been presented here represent only mininium, considerations which need to be addressed in designing and evaluating CTS options. 
SOCIAL FACTORS
Matters of organizational constraints are wide-ranging. They have a very long-term tinie orientation when it cones to doctrinal changes, and can have quite a short-tern, orientation when it caies to in-ccnbat decisions. For a host of other reasons as well, such constraints are ccnmplex and require a good deal of study. Yet, scaie predictive control can be realized, if all information resources are properly utilized. Training considerations are ccniplex as well, but while there may be little research impinging directly upon CTS issues, there is a wealth of related knowledge to draw from.
The area of social factors, on the other hand, is at best a very ccmnplicated issue in the military enviroment. Relevant matters concerning CTS might include motivation, group cohesiveness, and morale of affected personnel.
MOTIVATION. For example, considering motivation only, what would be the likely effects of CTS on an individual's career progression? Will all forms of CTS provide the same promotion opportunities? Those which would most closely fulfill requirenments of an individual's career path should be preferred to those approaches which require traininq tine outside the career path. In one respect, such potentially detrimental effects could be avoided by not choosing CTS tasks outside an individual's career management field (CMF). An alternative for scme tasks, naturally, is to make then, part of coaon soldiering tasks; if not common to all soldiers, at least camnon to all personnel in the appropriate unit.
Another consideration is the question of who it is that gets assigned to CTS. For example, scme individuals in support roles may have chosen these because such roles required only non-conbat duty. The effect on these individuals of undergoing CTS would have to be considered. Also to be considered is the effect which the presence and actions of these individuals would have on more ccnibat-prepared personnel undergoing the sane training. COHESION. A directly related topic concerns group cohesion. Using the COHORT (cohesiveness, operational readiness, training) model, the Army has been investigating cohort training and cohort transfers: the unit renains as an intact group in training and on duty tours (scmetinies referred to as the New Manning Plan; AC 600-82-2).
Such an approach can provide the group's men-bers with shared experiences, and a co, ton bond. (Greenbaunt, 1979) .
SUCH BONDS CAN BE BENEFICIAL IN TERMS OF PERFORMANCE AND A GENERAL TENDENCY TO RESIST THE ENEMY
Social Psychology and Industrial-Organizational Psychology research has found that a conaitment to super-ordinate goals (e.g., to a higher cause such as that of the Army or Society) is necessary for the formation and enhanced functioning of a printary group (e.g., a ccnpany or battery).
The development and maintenance of these prinary groups serves to reinforce an individual soldier's resolve and deternination to perform under dangerous conditions (Shils, 1950) .
A strong correlate of such resolve is apparently the social support provided by other soldiers:
Shiro, (1976) found that peer ratings of a soldier's performance were tied to the social support he was perceived to provide to others. Those findings suggested that GROUP INFLUENCE HAS A GREATER EFFECT ON CARRYING OUT J! A MISSION THAN DID EVEN THE AUTHORITARIAN LEADERSHIP, the traditional way of life in the military.
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The purpose of introducing the topic of cohesion is to point out its importance to overall group and individual performance, and the inherent personnel turbulence occurring during periods of surge. Severe turbulence can result in degradation of unit performance, a factor which must be taken into account in either evaluating or developing a CTS methodology.
A SOLUTION APPROPRIATE FOR SOME CASES WOULD BE TO BROADEN THE SIZE OF THE COHORT GROUP, thereby reducing the effects of "outside" substitutes on the group's performance--i.e., substitutes would cme frcn, within the cohort group itself. Another solution would involve rotation of personnel during training, so that key and support personnel could learn to perform effectively on the equipment, regardless of which particular individual is in which particular position. Such a tactic would at least moderate any negative effects on group cohesion which might result from required substitutions.
MORALE. A related and concluding note concerns morale. The reality of the surge situation would be that the unit or section was on the verge of being overtaken by the enety threat or otherwise pushed beyond their capabilities. Those soecifically trained with the critical activities as their primary tasks will have been neutralized. In one sense, the perception could be that even those best at their job had been overce, and that individuals only secondarily trained were to be used in a stop-gap measure. In the worst case the alternative to having undergone CTS would result in a complete rout by a given enetty force.
EXACTLY WHAT LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON MORALE COULD RESULT FROM SUCH FACTORS
NEEDS TO BE DETERMINED. Certainly any approach to CTS would have to include considerations of this nature if it is to have a realistic chance of being effective in the field.
PROPER GUIDANCE WOULD BE TO DETERMINE PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF AFFECTED PERSONNEL, ADJUST THE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS THROUGH TRAINING OR COUNSELING, AND MODIFY THE TRAINING AS NEEDED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOME OF THE VERY REAL NEGATIVE EXPECTATIONS WHICH EXISTED.
In one sense, the situation itself would have to be modified, e.g., either by providing more personnel support or more effective training, or by selecting personnel who were found to be unaffected by such concerns.
SUMMARY
The areas touched upon in the course of this paper have ranged across a variety of topics related to the developmnent of a means to survive a concentrated enemy military threat.
The direction chosen ccmprises a form of training termed "cross-training for surge."
As was previously conceded, the points discussed here represent only the minimun, considerations to be addressed in such a training effort. However, taken together, these points do offer a franework of critical elments, and are intended to be used as a set of guidelines for the evaluation and/or planning of CTS options. To repeat, this brief list of features is meant to represent the mninimnum considerations to be addressed in designing or evaluating a CTS methodology. Situational concerns, such as type of unit, anticipated battle enviromtent, and current budget considerations and doctrinal changes, might add to or otherwise require modification of such a checklist by various parties. These guidelines can be inmplemtented in directing the design of CTS. The purpose here was also in part to provide a basic structure, a framework for use in examining questions and issues related to possible CTS approaches. As such, this may be considered as well a preliminary effort, intended as much to characterize the needs leading to CTS and potential related areas of investigation as to elicit responses front military planners.
